Unity of effort between the Departments of Defense and State during operations other than war is analyzed through a study of inter-departmental organizational relationships, an assessment of assigned duties at the country team and regional level, and a comparison of Defense and State Department personality types. This analysis will show that much work has already been accomplished to physically connect the two organizations, that primary mission responsibilities are clearly stated, and that the dissimilarity in organizational personality types is key to understanding why unity of effort is difficult to preserve. The combatant commander will either lead or support other agencies in accomplishing missions designed to implement national * Combatant commanders are regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs). This paper uses the terms combatant commander, operational commander, unified commander, commander, and CINC interchangeably without loss of meaning.
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policy. In either situation, it is essential that the capabilities of each agency are used to their greatest potential and fashioned constructively to produce a single synergistic government force.
To effectively merge the military's-expertise with other agencies's attributes, the commander must actively pursue positive coordination efforts between his staff and the other government organizations with whom he is working. This is not necessarily an easy task, as there exist many obstacles to unity of effort.
Commanders must vigilantly work at overcoming unity barriers to ally government efforts. This paper examines three potential hurdles to unity of effort between the Departments of Defense and State during OOTW: 1) orianizational structure and linkages between the two departments; 2) assigned agency responsibilities for the various categories of OOTW; and, 3) the differences in organizational personality types which ultimately determine how each department operates.
In assessing these three barriers, I will first highlight each department's OOTW organizational structure. This presentation will show that much work has already been accomplished to physically connect the two organizations.
Second, at the country team/regional level, I will contrast the Finally, I will examine the differences between Defense and State Department personality types, and reveal why their dissimilarity is key to understanding why unity of effort is difficult to preserve.
A complete discussion of unity of effort between State and
Defense is, at times, difficult due to unity's dependence on several variable and complex interactions. To limit this paper, I will make the following assumptions:
1) the United States will remain a major influence in promoting regional stability;
2) U.S. budgetary constraints will be influential in the prioritization of resources to regions of concern;
3) regional situations will remain complex in nature, as suggested by Todd "First we must integrate our foreign policy...Our foreign policy grows lengthier by the day and, with it, the number of actors within the U.S. Government and outside it.
Without a truly integrated approach, we run the risk of incoherent, even
The Department of Defense places a likewise high priority on unity, as highlighted in the 1994 Annual Defense Report:
"080 face two major challenges: they must integrate with conventional forces, other U.S. agencies, friendly foreign forces and other international organizations, while preserving an element of autonomy necessary to protect and encourage the unconventional approach that is the soul of special operations." 9 4 Better defined duties and responsibilities also support Senator Jackson's suggested improvements.
What has not been clearly articulated in law has been formally agreed to by the two departments.
As mentioned Operating Forces responsibilities and authority (S167) there is no mandated condition for interagency unity of effort. The duties and responsibilities of the Ambassador and unified commander during OOTW are well defined by law and Presidential letter. In translating these assigned duties into actual plans, formal procedures exist to assist the country teams and CINC staffs in producing a well thought out and coherent plan. These formal planniig-and review methods ensure intraorganizational depth and inter-organizational breadth are integral to the plan.
Ogahizational Personality =TDe
The final barrier to unity of effort is common to everyday life; differences in personalities. This next section contrasts the organizational personalities of Defense and State.
Central to the comparison of State and Defense are the backgrounds and career paths of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and Military Officers (MOs); which, are remarkably similar. It is not surprising to discover that the Navy's officer system was 13 used as a model to develop the FSO personnel system. Four common FSO/MO personnel system characteristics are:
1) a ranking/promotion system; 2) a regular evaluation system; 3)
an up or out policy; 4) frequent rotation.
Elmer Plischke points out several similarities between these two systems in, United States Diplomats and Their Missions.
FSOs, for example, have rank levels of 05 to 01 which are comparable to the military's 01 to 06. Also, the average duration of a FSO tour on station is 3.1 years; comparable to the average length of tour for a military officer. 2
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To further highlight the similarities between typical career paths, both sets of officers go through a rigorous recruiting and entrance examination process. Once selected, they receive initial training and then 're detailed to the field to gain experience and work toward developing a career specialty.
At about the five year point both groups confront their first major career milestone. Here, the FSO's performance is assessed and he is either retained or released. The junior military officer has completed his initial obligation and, based on performance, decides whether he has a future career.
Mid-grade officers receive further specialty training and then, through a pay-back tour, are given specialty assignments that also further develop their leadership skills. During this time, officers are rotated through the field, and for those who desire, a follow-on tour in Washington. In both organizations, Washington experience is essential for more senior advancement. 
